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It has become increasingly common, in both history and political theory, to pay attention to space. 
The idea of a ‘spatial turn’ in history, reading for the spaces of human interaction as an essential part 
of thinking about that interaction itself, is very familiar by now. In political theory, likewise, there has 
been a wealth of new literature on political spaces and their frontiers, including a renewed attention to 
territory as a political phenomenon and concept. But the concept of space has yet to permeate, in any 
systematic way, the study of the history of political thought, even though the picture is beginning to 
change for intellectual history more broadly.
1
 Considerations of European political thought from a 
spatial perspective tend to come from scholars who are, at least to some extent, outside the discipline 
of the history of political thought.
2
 The reasons for this lie partly in disciplinary boundaries and 
different historiographical traditions. But it is also because many of the political theories offered by 
key figures of the Western tradition do not themselves systematically highlight space as a key element 
of human politics. Hobbes’s Leviathan represents, at least on the surface, a clear case of this. The state 
is an artificial man constructed by natural men through a covenant, that is, a mutual act of will. It is 
thus an inter-personal rather than a spatial phenomenon.
3
 And the state so constructed is itself, in turn, 
capable of acting at will: it is a person, though not a natural one. In short, the juridical metaphysics 
that makes the state, and makes the state an agent, seems to pull directly against an intrinsically spatial 
conception of it.
4
 Moreover, this is so for politics not merely in its domestic but also in its 
international dimension, a dimension that is receiving increasing attention, this time from within the 
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history of political thought.
5
 The early modern and subsequently modern construction of the 
international order in terms of sovereign states exported the same juridical metaphysics to the 
international arena, prioritising personality over spatiality. The post-Hobbesian conception of the 
equality of states as moral persons became an anchor of the ‘law of nations’ not only as a legal but a 
broader political discourse, an optic through which it was impossible to see the existence of empire in 
its very physical vastness and enormity.
6
 To read for space in many of the canonical texts of the 
history of political thought, then, is to read deliberately against the grain, with all the risks – although 
also the potential rewards – that that entails. 
It is not, of course, the case that all historical thinking about the international political order has been 
formulated within a legal idiom in which spatial relations are discounted. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the discourse of ‘reason of state’ evolved, within its capacious parameters, a 
sophisticated discussion of ‘the greatness of states’ in terms of material resources including 
population and territorial expanse. The eighteenth century, in turn, saw the development of a fully-
fledged economic analysis of international politics in terms of commercial rivalry, as well as setting 
itself to think seriously about size in relation to states, especially (but not only) in the context of 
empire. Nor was the discourse of natural law and the law of nations insulated from these other 
languages in which spatiality was more to the fore. The interaction between them has been 
emphasised and examined by Richard Tuck, István Hont and others.
7
 In this paper, however, my aim 
is to explore the intersection between politics, space and agency within the juridical framework of one 




Tuck’s Natural rights theories of 1979 revived Grotius as a critical figure in the development of early 
modern natural rights discourse.
9
 Much subsequent scholarship, including my own, has been indebted 
to this perspective, viewing Grotius’s legal and political thought through the lens of natural law and 
natural rights. In the course of this paper, however, I suggest that too exclusive a focus on the 
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naturalist paradigm of the individual agent armed with natural rights obscures the spatial dimension of 
Grotius’s thought, which is bound up with his analysis of the ineluctably spatial activity of war. 
Grotius’s handling of the legality of war appeals, in addition to natural law, to the ‘voluntary law of 
nations’, and this involves an understanding of the situatedness of political community which cannot 
be reduced to the model of individual agency. In parallel, much of the best recent scholarship has 
insisted on the importance of Grotius’s first work of natural law, De iure praedae (unpublished except 
for Chapter 12 which was reworked as Mare liberum in 1609), and of understanding DIBP in relation 
to the earlier work.
10
 In the present article, however, I read DIBP to some extent in isolation from De 
iure praedae, in order to highlight some of its distinctive new references and strategies. While in both 
works Grotius is preoccupied with empire as an underlying motive and concern, I suggest that in this 
later work he is as much interested in land as in sea and that it is on the question of the relationship 
between land and political community that he offers some of his most subtle and suggestive new 
thinking. Finally, I do not want to lose the dimension of agency entirely: space is the space not only of 
politics but of action, and thinking about agency in both war and politics is critical for thinking about 
spatiality, as well as vice versa. The first two sections of the paper, accordingly, attempt to map the 
terrain of politics and war; the third considers how that terrain interacts with actors and their agency in 
both. It is through the involvement of agency that the spatial analysis returns to the agency and indeed 
the personality of the state. 
 
I – THE SPACE OF POLITICS 
I begin with the space of politics. As we shall see later on, there is a question mark over whether that 
word is apt for Grotius at all: on one reading, his juridical enterprise is precisely to get out from under 
the shadow of the Aristotelian polis.
11
 But bracketing that issue for the moment, by ‘politics’ here I 
mean, so far as Grotius is concerned, the two kinds of voluntary arrangement that human beings enter 
into which have the net result of creating a public rather than a private right over them. These are 
‘consociation’ and ‘subjection’, which are supervenient on the natural society that is enjoined and 
protected by natural law. Grotius in the Prolegomena to DIBP mentions these two forms as if they 
were equally original forms of political arrangement into which individual human beings have 
entered.
12
 But it becomes clear in the course of the work that the political subjection envisaged is on 
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the part of a group of individuals who already form a populus, a ‘people’, which Grotius treats as 
equivalent to a civitas (the Latin translation of the Greek ‘polis’) as long as that populus has not 
surrendered itself to alien rule.
13
 Thus, the original political structure is a legal association between 
individuals, forming a united body of the people (universitas), in which public power rests with that 
body, governed by majority vote.
14
 In Book I, where Grotius handles the nature of the civitas en route 
to explaining the nature and existence of sovereign power, he is famously insistent that the original 
configuration does not have to stand for all time as the criterion of political legitimacy: the people can 
entirely alienate its power, if it so wills. But it nevertheless remains what Grotius calls the ‘common 
subject’ of that power, even though its ruler is the ‘proper subject’.  
Some underlying sense of place is involved in this story through the language of coire for the original 
movement of forming a political community, which Grotius terms a ‘consociation’.15 In such a 
community, for Grotius (as for the Spanish scholastics Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez), it is 
heads of household rather than individuals who come together.
16
 Nevertheless, in Grotius’s handling, 
consociatio is strictly a juridical relationship between persons.
17
 It is very important too, as we shall 
see below, that this relationship can move from place to place intact: a people can remain a people 
even in exile, and is thus not intrinsically linked to any particular place. It might seem, then, that 
DIBP is a clear case of the inter-personal paradigm to which I referred in the Introduction. However, 
Grotius’s interest in the movement of peoples itself suggests the spatial dimension to his political 
thought, and in the following two subsections I try to reconstruct this dimension from two different 
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angles. It should be acknowledged at the outset that, here as elsewhere, ‘space’ in itself is elusive: 
unless it is deliberately used in an abstract, ‘geometric’ sense – which is not in question here –, space 
tends to slide into aspects of bodies such as place or situation, size, relative distance, local motion or 
travel, as well as into metaphor so pervasive as to inflect what is apparently non-metaphorical usage.
18
 
That is, unless it is the direct object of theoretical discourse, space always seems to be something else. 
Much like power, it is articulated through other things, and exists only in that articulation: a mediated 
existence that is at once hard to confront and nevertheless partially constitutive of the very things 
through which it is mediated. In what follows I embrace this diffuse conception of space as part of the 
very political way of thinking that is the ultimate object of the analysis. 
I – Tracking the occupation of space 
In a major recent study, Andrew Fitzmaurice has argued that, in the early modern sources, ‘the 
relation between political society and the place in which people lived was made tangible through 
occupation’ (occupation being the originally Roman legal principle whereby, under natural law, what 
belongs to no one becomes the property of the first person physically to grasp hold of it).
19
 He is 
certainly right to point to the central role of occupation, but there are complications involved in the 
case of DIBP because in two key respects Grotius did not appeal purely to that concept. First, as 
Fitzmaurice recognises, Grotius in Chapter 2 of Book II of DIBP (‘Concerning the original acquisition 
of right in things’) deployed in addition a scholastic – or at least, broadly theological – concept of 
‘division’ following the original common ownership of things.20 In the hands of sixteenth-century 
scholastics such as Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto, division is at the heart of the ius 
gentium, the law of nations. It is explained through a spatio-temporal story, largely taken from sacred 
history, of the descendants of Noah spreading out and settling the islands of the globe, and again of 
Abraham and Lot going their separate ways.
21
 In Grotius’s hands, the Flood is only one moment in the 
story of division, which Grotius rolls together with the tower of Babel. Nevertheless, as his chapter 
‘Concerning the original acquisition of right in things’ makes clear, it is still division which is the 
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original mode of generating right in lands, with occupation a subsequent moment.
22
 This story, with 
its biblical references, is absent from the accounts of the genesis of property in De iure praedae and 
Mare liberum, for which the sources are almost entirely Roman.
23
  
Thus, Grotius narrates, in the beginning all things were common to all, by gift of God, a gift that was 
repeated after the Flood when the world was restored. That does not mean that individuals had no 
juridical purchase of their own on any of those things. What there was for individuals was a ‘use of 
the universal right’ (usus universalis iuris), which Grotius illustrated with the famous example from 
Cicero of someone ‘occupying’ a theatre seat. But this was not the ‘occupation’ that made a thing 
one’s own. The occupation of something communis rather than nullius had the legal form of usus iuris 
(rightful use) rather than property or dominium.
24
 However, the invention of the arts, the end of 
primitive simplicity, put an end to this legal world. The first brothers, Abel and Cain, practised their 
different skills ‘not without a certain distribution of things’ (non sine aliqua rerum distributione). But 
this led to emulation, and even to slaughter (caedes) and the ‘life of giants, that is, of violence’ (vitae 
genus giganteum, i.e. violentum).
 
This savage world was purged by the Flood, but more trouble 
ensued, this time from wine and pleasure.
25
 However, it was ‘a more noble vice, ambition, the sign of 
which was the tower of Babel’ that decisively ruptured the state of harmony (concordia), and 
thereafter ‘different [individuals] possessed different lands separately’ (alii alias terras partito 
possederunt).
26
 Even at this point, there was still common pastureland between neighbours. But 
eventually, when the number of men and flocks increased, the lands began to be divided, not into 
gentes (‘nations’) as heretofore, but into families, familiae.27 In the first mention of occupation as 
creating a property right for the occupier, Grotius tells us that wells, ‘very necessary in a dry region’, 
were occupied (rather than divided), and thereby belonged to the person who occupied them.
28
 
What Grotius offers, in this compressed and not entirely clear account, is a kind of juridical 
commentary the narrative that Genesis presents, of people simultaneously in relation to other people 
and in relation to land and features of the land like wells.
29
 The contours of the original division of the 
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lands into gentes remain uncertain, however, as Grotius gives no further hint here as to who the gentes 
are – whether, for example, they include the Libyan Garamantes who come up later on as an example 
of a gens; or the Scythians, or the Germans; or the gentes of America, the object of Grotius’s later 
(1642) Dissertatio de origine gentium americanarum.
30
 However, in the subsequent section of 
Chapter 2, which explains why the high seas are still in common, Grotius deployed not merely the 
argument from occupation which had characterised his earlier (1604-5) De iure praedae (something 
indefinite, and fluid, such as the sea, cannot be occupied), but also an argument from division. 
Granted the sea cannot be occupied, he insisted, ‘neither can we invent a division: for when the lands 
were first divided, the greatest part of the sea was unknown; and because of that no way can be 
imagined by which nations placed so far apart (gentes adeo dissitae) could agree on a division.’31 The 
reasoning seems to be that nations who had not discovered the oceans to their full extent could not sail 
across them to agree to divide them up (division, Grotius stresses, requires express consent, whereas 
occupation involves tacit consent).
32
 It seems clear, then, that division is a global story about the 
entire earth that created an original geo-political order, even if its contours are uncertain.
33
 Grotius is 
insistent that after those ‘first times’, division was no longer a possible mode of acquisition of right in 
the land; only occupation remains as a source of new right.
34
 Certainly, this puts a premium on 
‘occupation’ in the acquisition of right; but it is also important to note that occupation operates only 
within an existing spatial order of gentes, even if there remain (rather – and purposefully? – vaguely) 
‘many places still uncultivated (loca adhuc inculta)’, and ‘islands in the sea’. Grotius’s note here 
points the reader to Book VI of Pietro Bembo’s Historiae Venetae, which recounts Columbus’s 
voyage and subsequent Spanish and Portuguese explorations in America and in Africa.
35
 
Grotius ends his section on the original division with a passage of almost Schmittian flavour: ‘when 
the ancients called Ceres a lawgiver, and called her rites the Thesmophoria [thesmos meaning a law in 
the sense of something that has been laid down], they signified this, that from the division of the fields 
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there came about the origin of a new ius’.36 That last point is an important one: although the chapter is 
entitled ‘Original acquisition of right in things’, which might suggest that the right pre-exists the 
acquisition, this is not the case. Rather, in the case of original (as opposed to ‘derivative’) acquisition, 
the acquisition of the right and the genesis of the right are simultaneous. I think this is the sense of the 
locution that we shall encounter presently, when Grotius talks of ‘occupying’ both imperium (which I 
shall translate ‘sovereignty’) and dominium. Neither of these were lying around for the taking 
beforehand, so to speak, but were created in the same moment as the occupation. A patchwork of right 
is created with the patchwork of the ground. 
Grotius goes on to give more detail on how occupation proceeds following those first times, yielding a 
clearer picture of the patchwork. Here he introduces into his story a second conceptual complication, 
necessary to account for the occupation of land. Such occupation, he says, can happen in two ways.
37
 
The first is per universitatem, universally (the universitas being the corporate body that is created 
through consociation); the second is per fundos, by farms or estates. Universal occupation happens 
through the people (populus) or whoever commands (imperat) the people. The second type of 
occupation occurs by individuals and is said to be in fact more a case of ‘assignation’ than ‘free 
occupation’. If anything occupied universally has not been marked out for individual ownership (in 
singulos dominos descriptum), that does not mean it is ‘vacant’ (vacuum): it belongs to the original 
occupier, the people or the king. Grotius specifies that these tend to be such things as rivers, lakes, 
marshes, woods, and steep mountains. The occupation of land, then, is primarily a public act, and the 
resultant dominium is a kind of public ownership. The underlying model is, in fact, the Roman ager 
publicus, something that Grotius goes on to confirm by explicit appeal to the Roman agrimensores or 
land surveyors. Ager publicus was land acquired by the Roman res publica through conquest, and 
publicly owned.
38
 Grotius’s appeal to this legal form in the context of occupation ambiguously fuses 
public and private, iure gentium and iure naturali modes of acquisition.
39
 With its distinction between 
public and private occupation – the latter not, in fact, strictly speaking occupation – it refines the 
analysis offered in De iure praedae and Mare liberum, from Seneca and Cicero, according to which 
‘the occupancy of public possessions is achieved by the same method as occupancy of private 
possessions.’40 
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Grotius may well have come to know of the corpus agrimensorum from the edition published in 1614 
by a member of his new circle of intellectual friends in Paris, Nicolas Rigault.
41
 Rigault was the 
librarian of Louis XIII, praised for his care in that office by Grotius in his Silva ad Thuanum, a poem 
addressed to François-Auguste de Thou and published in Paris in 1621 as a form of self-
introduction.
42
 Rigault dedicated his 1614 edition to the king with a letter in which he argued for the 
utility of the agrimensores in the defining the boundaries of empire (fines imperii), a project that he 
links firmly with Louis XIII and his reign. Kingdoms in their greatness, he proposed, were like 
athletes in their prime, needing a little of their strength to be ‘deducted’ or ‘led off’: not into allied or 
friendly states, but by sowing colonies in ‘half-savage’ and barbarous nations, towns in the deserted 
wastes. ‘New settlements (novae sedes) should be sought for an overflowing France… So, my lord, 
you will conquer through settling; thus the barbarians will leave behind their savagery and become 
human beings…’.43 Grotius in DIBP has nothing like this unashamed justification of overseas 
settlement in the interests of the mother-country, nor the notorious argument from civilisation, both of 
which had been deployed not only by Rigault and others in France but also in the Netherlands prior to 
the formal establishment of the Dutch West India Company in 1621.
44
 If we are looking for the nature 
and extent of Grotius’s imperialism, his distance from this kind of argument is one measure of it.45 
Nevertheless, DIBP does leave room, not only for further public occupation of any remaining 
‘uncultivated’ places and islands, but also, with caveats, for some kind of private overseas settlement. 
This position might not only accommodate Dutch visions; it might also be favourable to the 
commercial ambitions of Louis XIII and Richelieu, who made overtures to Grotius in 1626 even if the 
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 There existed an earlier edition, De agrorum conditionibus et constitutionibus limitum, by Adrian Turnèbe 
(Paris 1554), but there is no mention of it in De iure praedae. 
42
 See H.J.M. Nellen, ‘Grotius et le monde intellectual parisien’, in Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis / 
Dutch Review of Church History 80/3 (2000), 282-295. Grotius would later defend Rigault’s interpretation of a 
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‘Disputando inclarescit veritas: Grotius as a publicist in France, 1621-1645’, in H.J.M. Nellen and E. Rabbie 
eds., Grotius the theologian. Essays in honour of G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 121-144, at 
pp. 132-4. 
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 Nicolas Rigault, Auctores finium regundorum (Paris 1614), Ep. Ded. Rigault later published a justification of 
Louis’s policy in the controversy over French intervention in the Valtelline: William F. Church, Richelieu and 
reason of state (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 138 n. 83. 
44
 For the broader intellectual and political context of views such as Rigault’s, see Saliha Belmessous, 
‘Greatness and decadence in French America’, Renaissance Studies 26/4 (2012), 559-579, at pp. 565-570; for 
the Netherlands, Arthur Weststeijn, ‘Republican empire: colonialism, commerce and corruption in the Dutch 
Golden Age’, in the same volume of Renaissance Studies, 491-50, at p. 497. Publicists for the Dutch West India 
Company stressed the need to acquire colonies in the Indies in order to secure Dutch trade: Jonathan Israel, 
Dutch primacy in world trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 157. 
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 Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, property and empire, p. 99; compare Camille Boisen, ‘Grotius and empire’, 
Grotiana 36/1 (2015), 28-39. 
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 Erik Thomson, ‘France’s Grotian moment? Hugo Grotius and Cardinal Richelieu’s commercial statecraft’, 
French History 21/4 (2007), 377-394. 
In a move that has attracted critical comment from the eighteenth century to the twenty-first, Grotius 
coupled the Roman model of public land ownership with a variant on the traditional dichotomy 
between jurisdiction (dominium iurisdictionis) and property (dominium proprietatis). Thus, he argued, 
there is a distinction between occupation of imperium (sovereignty) and occupation of dominium 
(property).
47
 Imperium and dominium are most often acquired in single act, but they can be separated, 
so that dominium can pass to outsiders (extranei) even while imperium remains with the original 
holder. Grotius appealed for support to a passage from the Roman surveyor Siculus Flaccus’s De 
conditionibus agrorum, on the assignation of agri to coloni.
48
 This separation of imperium from 
dominium allowed him to argue that not merely individuals, but also entire peoples on the move, can 
acquire dominium in a foreign land provided they submit to the jurisdiction of that place.
49
 A people is 
allowed to remain a cohesive public body, even when on the move, by a further split within the notion 
of imperium conditioned by two different ‘subject-matters’: imperium over persons and imperium 
over place, ‘which is called territory’. The former ‘is sometimes enough, as in a company (exercitus) 
of men, women and children seeking a new home (novas sedes).’50 Such communities are by natural 
law allowed to stay in a host country, and may even rightly ‘occupy’ any places within that country 
which are ‘sterile and deserted’: for, Grotius says, something that is not cultivated should not be 
thought to be occupied, or at least only in respect of imperium.
51
 
As Jean Barbeyrac pointed out in 1720, this passage is in simple contradiction with Grotius’s prior 
insistence that anything occupied by a people or king and not assigned to individual owners remains 
within the dominium of that people or king.
52
 But Grotius later on appears to retreat from the 
universality of that prior claim with the remark that sometimes the people or head of the people 
acquires not only imperium and its accompanying ‘eminent domain’ (dominium eminens), but also 
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 DIBP II.3.4.1. Keene, Beyond the anarchical society, pp. 56-7, underlines the importance of this distinction 
and its colonial implications. He rightly characterises imperium as public while dominium is private. But it is 
important that this does not mean that all dominium belongs to private individuals. Grotius’s position allows – 
although, as we shall see, it does not in fact require – a public body or agent (the people or its sovereign) to have 
private dominium over its land.  
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 DIBP II.3.4.2. Flaccus’s work could be found in Rigault’s edition, and also in Turnèbe’s. The specific passage 
can be found in a modern edition in Siculus Flaccus. Les conditions des terres, tr. M. Clavel-Lévêque et al. 
(Napoli: Jovene Editore, 1993), p. 100; the facing-page translation reads: ‘En outre, lorsque les auteurs de 
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commented on by Grotius’s eighteenth-century editor Jean Barbeyrac, who argued (together with the work’s 
1674 editor, Goesius) that jurisdiction in fact acceded to the colony, hence nullifying Grotius’s argument.  
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 DIBP II.2.16. 
50
 DIBP II.3.4.1. Notice that the passage suggests there can be no imperium over place without imperium over 
people, although not vice versa. 
51
 DIBP II.2.17. 
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 I.e. DIBP II.2.4; for Barbeyrac’s comment see Grotius, The rights of war and peace, ed. Tuck, p. 448, in the 
note: ‘He does not there [sc. at II.2.4] distinguish Jurisdiction from property; and that Distinction is equally ill 
grounded in this Case, and liable to great Inconveniences.’ 
‘private and full dominium’ which it then distributes to individuals.53 It is only in such a case that 
derelict lands do not fall to the occupier. Is there any such case beyond the Roman, though, and what 
do we presume in case of doubt? Grotius is silent, and it is hard to avoid the depressing conclusion 
that the analysis is asymmetrically weighted in favour of those states which can offer some kind of 
proof that they own their land, in the full private sense, and those which, for the most obvious reasons, 
cannot. It is true that Grotius’s talk of peoples or public bodies on the move refers only to exiles, those 
who have been expelled from their home and are compelled to seek a new place.
54
 In Chapter 22 of 
Book II, ‘On unjust causes’, he includes among them the simple ‘desire to change location (sedes), so 
that more fertile ground can be possessed, leaving behind the marshes and the deserts’.55 The same 
chapter contains his outright condemnation of the argument from barbarism and natural slavery (‘Nor 
is it less unjust to wish to subdue certain people by force of arms, as if worthy to be slaves’), and his 
general maxim that ‘utility does not create a right equal to that of necessity’.56 This restraint might be 
read as a tacit corrective to Rigault’s advocacy of French public settlement in the interests of France. 
But nevertheless Grotius’s argument says nothing against a private trading company, for instance, 
occupying ‘derelict’ land for reasons of utility in a place where the people cannot be shown publicly 
to hold ‘private and full’ dominium as well as imperium over the place (although the caveat remains 
that it would have to submit to the imperium of the local inhabitants). In sum, it is not the imperium / 
dominium distinction per se, but the ambiguity over public ownership, which creates the conditions 
for colonial exploitation.  
Meanwhile, as we have just seen, the imperium / dominium divide has produced a definition – if only 
the very briefest definition – of territory as place subject to imperium, associating territory clearly 
with imperium rather than dominium. But the few other passages in the work that explicitly articulate 
the concept of territory do not sit entirely happily with this definition. Skipping ahead for a moment to 
Book III, to the question of the acquisition of goods in war, Grotius allows that captured land (ager 
captus) falls under this heading so long as it is not just temporarily occupied but enclosed in 
permanent fortifications such that it cannot be recovered by the other side. In this sense he approves 
Siculus Flaccus’s etymology of the word ‘territory’ from ‘terrifying enemies’ (a terrendis hostibus).57 
But ager captus, as we shall see more fully later on, is ager publicus, and acquired in the sense of 
ownership, dominium, not simply imperium. 
Back in Book II, Grotius offers some further thoughts on the distinction between privately-owned 
land and territory, again with reference to the Roman ager, in a discussion of what happens to 
imperium when the course of a river changes. Here, Grotius appealed to the mensores for a threefold 
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 DIBP II.3.19.2. Grotius explains dominium eminens at DIBP I.1.6. 
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 DIBP II.2.16, cf. DIBP II.9.7. 
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 DIBP II.22.8. 
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 DIBP II.22. 6, 10 and 12. 
57
 DIBP III.6.3.1-2. 
division of agri. Some (agri limitati) have artificial boundaries; some are allotted by the universitas 
according to some system of measurement (Grotius refers to the Roman system of centuriation); yet 
others have natural boundaries like rivers and mountains, and are called arcifinii, a word (according to 
the Roman etymologist Varro) that signifies their suitability for warding off enemies (arcendis 
hostibus).
58
 In the case of such agri, Grotius holds, the alteration in the course of a river does affect 
the extent of imperium (as not in the others), because we are to understand that the will of the peoples 
involved on either side was for the river to form a ‘natural terminus’. Where there is doubt, imperia 
which lie next to rivers are to be presumed to be arcifinia, ‘because nothing is more apt for 
distinguishing between imperia than something that cannot easily be crossed.’59 Going further, 
however, all imperia are presumed (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) to be arcifinia, 
‘because that is most appropriate to the nature of territory; but it is more to be believed that private 
lands are not arcifinii, but either limitati, or contained within a certain measurement, because this is 
more congruent to the nature of private possessions.’60 At this point, the nature of territory itself takes 
over from the will of peoples to become the dominant interpretative principle, underlining the 
distinction between public and private occupation of land. Private ownership is of spaces that are in 
some sense secondary, artificially delimited or measured in some way. The primary natural spaces of 
the globe, bounded by natural features, are territory, place subject to sovereignty, place to be 
defended by public arms against public enemies (hostes). It is noteworthy that in this context, Grotius 
has come to speak of imperia in something like the modern, fused sense of ‘empires’, in which the 
sovereign power and the territory are melded together into one entity. 
II – Politics, space and moral reasoning 
With some, albeit indeterminate, picture of the spatially-settled world, then, I want to ask my question 
again about the space of politics. First I will address the contention that this work is not really about 
‘politics’ at all. This claim has some force. All the material we have been looking at so far comes 
from the beginning of Book II, the book in which Grotius maps out the field of ius or ‘right’. ‘Right’ 
in the DIBP is understood principally as individual rights; and these rights are the object of 
‘commutative justice’, the justice of contracts and exchange, rather than ‘distributive justice’ which, 
in Grotius’s handling, deals not with rights strictly speaking but only with claims.61 Grotius’s reason 
for treating them in such depth is that a just cause of war is always a violation of right. Moreover (as 
we shall see more fully in Sections II and III of this paper), the resort to war is licit where there is no 
possibility of redress from a judge, that is, where no civil action can be granted the plaintiff: ubi 
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 DIBP II.3.16.1. Grotius adds that another of the agrimensores, Aggenus Urbicus, calls these agri 
‘occupatorii’, because these are the ones that tend to get occupied in war or because they lie vacant; again he 
could have found this in Rigault’s edition, pp. 148-150. 
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 DIBP II.3.17.2. 
60
 DIBP II.8.12.1. 
61
 DIBP I.1.4-8. 
iudicia desinunt, incipit bellum.
62
 Whether the plaintiff is a public or private body, therefore, it exists 
insofar as it is a rights-holder within the sphere of commutative justice, while the more political 
‘distributive justice’ is drastically reduced in significance. This anti-Aristotelian, and more broadly 
anti-teleological, move has been underlined by several recent commentators, although it has clear 
origins in late scholastic thought, especially in the work of Luis de Molina.
63
 It makes the polis, the 
‘city’, an agent of commerce and indeed itself part of the commerce. Thus, Chapter 5 of Book II, 
where we find the account of public consociation as a universitas detailed at the start of this paper, 
discusses the acquisition of right in persons exactly parallel to the acquisition of right in things. Both 
the universitas and its ruler are subject to the rules of commutative justice: an ‘empire of private law’, 
to use Martti Koskenniemi’s phrase, to be enforced, in the last instance, by war.64  
All of this is right. But I think, first, that Grotius preserves more of the Aristotelian polis than is 
sometimes supposed. An Aristotelian echo is present in Grotius’s insistence that the civitas is ‘the 
most perfect society’, and gives maximum right to the universitas over its members.65 He uses directly 
Aristotelian terms and references to describe the internal structure of the respublica and the activity of 
the ruler within it. Thus, ‘Aristotle makes three parts in administering the commonwealth, deliberation 
on common affairs, the responsibility to select magistrates, and legal judgements’.66 The art of the 
ruler is either concerned with universal or particular matters, appealing to Aristotle’s distinction in 
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics between two types of political art (politikē), architektonikē 
(involved in legislation) and politikē more strictly, that is bouleutikē (concerned with the council) and 
dikastikē (concerned with the law-courts).67 He also cites Aristotle’s principle that a polis cannot 
become too large without ceasing to be so, using Aristotle’s own analogy of a ship: ‘For just as a ship 
can extend to such a size that it is impossible to be steered, thus both the number of men and the 
distances between places can become so great, that it cannot support one government.’68 
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 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International law and the emergence of mercantile capitalism: Grotius to Smith’, in 
P.-M. Dupuy and V. Chetail eds., The roots of international law / Les fondements du droit international 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 1-37; Straumann, Roman law in a state of nature, pp. 119-129. For the scholastic 
background, Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and international law: The real Spanish contribution’, 61 University of 
Toronto Law Journal (2011), 1-36; Annabel Brett, ‘Luis de Molina on law and power’, in A. Aichele and M. 
Kaufmann eds., A companion to Luis de Molina (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 155-182. 
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 Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and international law’, p. 1. Thus, at DIBP II.24.7, Grotius agrees with Molina that a 
king who undertakes an unnecessary war is liable under commutative justice to make restitution to his subjects 
for damages. Again, at the start of Book III (DIBP III.2.2.1-2) on the liability of subjects’ goods to reprisals, 
Grotius argues that in principle they are not liable, because in Roman private law ‘it is not the case that what the 
universitas owes, individuals owe’. That they are in fact so, is a function of the ius gentium voluntarium 
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 DIBP II.5.23. 
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 DIBP I.3.6.1. 
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 Ibid. n. 2. 
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 DIBP II.22.13.1. Given that the context here is the rejection of universal dominium of the Roman emperor, 
Grotius is likely to have culled this Aristotelian point and reference from Domingo de Soto’s critique of that 
universal dominium in De iustitia et iure (Salamanca 1556), Lib. IV, q. 4 (‘Whether the Roman emperor is lord 
of the world’). 
A second point to be made, though, and more important in the context of this paper, concerns 
Grotius’s language for what we might broadly think of as the political community or association, 
which is fluid between gens (‘nation’), populus (‘people’), civitas (‘city’ in the sense of political 
community, polis), and respublica (‘commonwealth’). All of these involve that moment of ‘coming 
together’ (coire), that creation of civil power and civil law, of which we spoke at the beginning. That 
this is true for gens as well as for the other, more obviously political terms is clear from the opening 
of Book I, which speaks of the ‘disputes of those who are bound by no common civil law, of which 
kind are both those who have not yet come together into a nation (in gentem), and those who are of 
different nations between themselves’.69 It is hard to find clear demarcation lines between the terms. 
Grotius accents the different elements of terminology differently, however, depending on the context. 
Thus, it is gentes who are spatially divided. It is populi or whoever commands them, as we have seen, 
who occupy the land. It is also the populus which pre-eminently carries a political identity, which 
remains the same despite change of government: the populus Romanus is the classic example, the 
same under both the Republic and the Principate. It is the civitas which is the association of heads of 
household into a body politic, and which constitutes the ‘common subject’ of sovereign power; while 
the respublica, true to Ciceronian terminology, represents the common bond of right and justice. 
It turns out, however, that this Ciceronian definition has to be relaxed if we want to think 
appropriately about the scope of public war. In Chapter 3 of Book III, Grotius establishes his category 
of bellum solenne, war that is formally just through being conducted after a formal declaration 
between two populi having sovereign imperium. This involves him in the contrast with ‘pirates’ or 
bands of robbers that Grotius’s predecessor Alberico Gentili had so strikingly deployed in this 
context.
70
 In the Ciceronian tradition, the distinction turns on the justice that characterises respublicae 
but not pirates or bands of robbers. But here Grotius is keen to insist that a respublica or civitas does 
not cease to be such the moment it acts unjustly, nor vice versa the band of robbers if occasionally it 
acts justly; the difference lies in the differing teleology, the one an association for enjoying right and 
law, the other an association for criminal purposes.
71
 The acts of injustice that a civitas can commit 
and still be a civitas can be quite extensive and prolonged: thus the Greeks in ancient times lived 
largely from booty (praeda), though they observed certain rules of the practice.
72
 Likewise, the 
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 The reference is ultimately to Thucydides, The war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, ed. and tr. J. 
Mynott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), I. 5-6, p. 5. 
Germans were fond of robbery (latrocinia) but were still a populus; so too the Libyan Garamantes, a 
gens fecund with latrocinia, was nevertheless a gens. Grotius appeals here to Augustine’s famous 
corrective to Cicero in Book IV of The city of God, redefining a commonwealth through concord 
rather than justice. ‘A civitas is still a civitas, even if it is very sick’: as long as there remains some 




I think, then, that what is most interesting about Grotius’s conception of political entities is its 
capacity to embrace the ‘ethnological’ element inherent in the notion of gentes, and the group identity 
inherent in populi, together with the more strictly juridical structure of the civitas or respublica with 
its sovereign imperium and its structure of laws and courts. The contours of the political are limned 
through a multivalent terminology which deliberately defies any overly-reductive conceptualisation. 
To return to the start of this section, then, it is certainly true that Grotius subjects both individuals and 
public corporate bodies to the same justice of contracts and exchange, a line of thought that tends to 
promote an analogy between individual and ‘state’ and to depoliticise the latter, making it just one 
more juridical agent in a potential ‘state of nature’. But another line of his thinking pulls in a very 
different direction, towards a genuinely spatial conception of the polity,  a place bounded by 
mountains and rivers in which a people or a nation with a distinctive identity practises its distinctive 
form of life with its distinctive institutions. It is this that transforms space into something political in 
itself. 
The key notion doing the work in this more fluid conception is that of ‘morals’, moralia, a category 
that Grotius deploys in the same sense as the later scholastics, in talking, for example, of the demand 
that civil law be ‘morally’, as opposed to physically, ‘possible’. In morals, we reason from the end, 
and we do not insist on mathematical exactitude. Thus, in the critique of Cicero just mentioned, 
Grotius asserts that ‘in morals (in moralibus), the principal element is taken for the form [of the 
whole]’.74 Or again, ‘in a matter that belongs to morals (in morali materia), those things which are 
conducive to an end receive their intrinsic value from that end itself: wherefore those things that are 
necessary to the end of obtaining our right, with necessity understood not according to physical 
accuracy, but in a moral sense (moraliter), to those things we are understood to have a right [as 
well].’75 Again, discussing the time-frame of self-defence, Grotius argues that ‘in morals’ – though in 
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this case there is an analogy with ‘naturals’ – a point of time (punctum) always has ‘a certain 
latitude’.76 
For present purposes, the most important place in which the kind of reasoning appropriate to ‘morals’ 
impacts upon the conception of politics is back towards the beginning of Book II on the subject of 
original acquisition, when Grotius, having dealt with the land, considers fish, birds and wild animals. 
In principle, these are the classic case of ‘things that belong to no one’ (nullius), which thus, under 
natural law, can be ‘occupied’ by anyone, in any place. But Grotius argues that the holder of 
imperium over land and the adjoining sea
77
 can by civil law prohibit the acquisition of these things 
without contravening natural law.
78
 Further, he stipulates that such a prohibition would apply not only 
to his own people but to foreigners as well, aligning himself with the common late-scholastic 
principle that a foreigner is obliged by the laws of the country he is visiting. ‘The reason is, that for 
the government of a people it is morally necessary that those who mingle with them even only 
temporarily, which happens on entering the territory, should render themselves conformable to the 
institutions of that people.’79 If this is not strictly an Aristotelian teleology of ‘the best’, it is 
nevertheless a distinctive moral teleology of ordered political life, which brings a ‘moral necessity’ in 
its wake. Political life cannot tolerate strangers disobeying laws that inhabitants are forced to observe: 
disorder would ensue.  
What Grotius here rejects is a kind of picture in which foreigners, not being members of the civitas 
which they enter, remain, even when they are within it, under natural law rather than civil law: that is, 
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in a ‘state of nature’. In this picture, foreigners may, by the natural law which governs the state of 
nature, lay their hands on any fish or birds or wild animals that roam around in the territory – which, 
in fact, does not have that identity as ‘territory’ under natural law, being merely natural place. This is 
exactly the scenario that he himself had invoked, in his earlier De iure praedae, to defend his position 
that punishment is a natural right: ‘the state inflicts punishment for wrongs against itself, not only 
upon its own subjects but also upon foreigners; yet it derives no power over the latter from civil law, 
which is binding upon citizens only because they have given their consent; and therefore, the law of 
nature, or law of nations, is the source from which the state receives the power in question.’80 As 
Richard Tuck remarked long ago, this is the same argument that John Locke would use for the same 
purposes in the Second Treatise of Government.
81
 But we can now see why Grotius dropped it from 
DIBP. Although, in Chapter 20 of Book II of that work, Grotius retained a defence of the natural right 
to punish, the ‘alien argument’ for it is not only redundant, but goes against everything that Grotius 
wants to say about the necessary implication of space and political power, which does not rest on 
personal consent alone.
82
 It also goes against everything he wants to say about the space of war under 
the voluntary law of nations, to which I now turn. 
 
 II – THE SPACE OF WAR 
Grotius defines war as ‘the state of those contending by force’ (status per vim certantium).83 War 
divides into private, i.e. on the part of private individuals, and public, i.e. on the part of those who 
hold summum imperium, although it is important that these too are individual human agents. With one 
exception, as we shall see later on, Grotius does not think of ‘the state’ – for which he has no one 
word anyway, as we have seen – as an agent, a ‘moral person’ as the later tradition would have it.84 Of 
these two kinds of war, Grotius says, private war is ‘more ancient’, ‘before’ the establishment of 
iudicia, i.e. civil law courts.
85
 Given that he asserts that war begins where courts stop, we apparently 
have a picture of a time, prior to the institution of the civitas with its civil law and courts, in which the 
only remedy for violation of right was force: a ‘state of nature’, no less, which would have been 
spatially unlimited because there were as yet no territorial boundaries. Just as this space was modified 
by civitates with their territories, so the natural rights of individuals to resort to force – both to defend 
and to punish – were restricted by the establishment of civil remedies. However, these natural rights 
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remain in force, and therefore private war is justified, after the establishment of civitates in certain 
circumstances. Such circumstances occur either temporarily, when recourse to a judge cannot be had 
before serious harm occurs; or continuously, and in this case either de jure or de facto: de jure, ‘if 
someone is about in unoccupied places, for example the sea, the desert, empty islands, and if there are 
any other places where there is no civitas’, and de facto, if subjects do not accept the judge or vice 
versa.
86
 Compare the very opening sentence of the book, part of which we looked at earlier: ‘The 
disputes of those who are bound by no common civil law, of which sort are both those who have not 
yet come together into a nation, and those who are of different nations among themselves, both 
private individuals and kings themselves, and any who have a right equal to that of kings, whether 
these be senators (optimates), or free peoples, [these disputes] belong either to time of war or to time 
of peace.’ We seem to have a very strong analogy, then, between a ‘state of nature’ and the 




One difficulty with this account comes with the spatial scope of the state of nature. We have already 
seen, in the case of aliens, how Grotius’s territorial argument circumscribes the natural right to punish 
in DIBP. Apart from the high seas, the deserts that Grotius equates to seas,
88
 and the uninhabited 
islands that we have already encountered, therefore, the space of this natural right can only exist 
‘where there is no civitas’. In Book II Chapter 20, Grotius argues that the natural right to punish was 
operative ‘before’ civitates and is still in force, in places where human beings (homines) live 
distributed in families rather than civitates.
89
 This language echoes his description of the formation of 
political community in Chapter 5 of that book: a ‘consociation, by which many heads of household 
(patres familiarum) come together into one people and civitas’.90 We can now see, however, that 
Grotius’s appropriation of this scholastic account is in this respect problematic, because the sacred 
history narrative of settlement that Grotius offers suggests that families are already part of gentes, and 
Grotius’s political language, as we have seen, equates the existence of gentes with civitates and with 
the existence of civil law. While, in DIBP, he shares with them the narrative of an original spatial 
division of the world into gentes, the scholastics had not formally equated gentes with civitates. Thus, 
in the eyes of Luis de Molina, Grotius’s target in the question of punishment, it was perfectly possible 
that there might indeed be some places where gentes lived in family groupings without having yet 
formed a civitas, ‘as is apparently the case in the region of Brazil’.91 In such a situation, Molina 
argued, heads of families must take the place of sovereigns and wield a public right to punish. Grotius 
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turned the argument around to make the public right a natural right (not without some prompting from 
Molina himself, who had admitted the possibility only to reject it). But this leaves a possible scenario 
of lands populated by isolated families for which Grotius offers no explanation.
92
 This may account 
for his hesitation in affirming that such places definitely exist. 
There are also, however, tensions that strain the analogy itself. We can see this if we investigate a 
little bit more closely the natural right of self-defence that both public and private individuals possess. 
Self-defence is equally legitimate for both. And yet, although the action on both of their parts is 
analogously just under the law of nature, it is disanalogous in other ways. For a private individual, 
what is in question is ‘present force’ against his body, ‘with danger of death no otherwise 
avoidable’.93 Private self-defence, then, is in puncto: at a specific point in time. As always in ‘moral 
matters’, we are not talking mathematics; as we have seen, there is a certain latitude – one does not 
have to wait for the weapon actually to touch one’s body. However, more extended temporal 
anticipation is illicit: ‘in private war the right is quasi-momentary, and ceases as soon as the matter 
allows access to a judge’.94 But the case is different for public powers, where there is indeed no judge: 
here even a war of self-defence has extended temporal duration, being perpetuated by every new act 
of injustice. It is, moreover, inevitably mingled with the right of revenge, which public powers have 
and individuals do not. As a result, ‘it is licit for them to prevent force not only present, but which is 
seen to be imminent from afar, not directly (for we have already taught that that would be unjust), but 
indirectly, by revenging a crime that has already begun but has not yet been consummated.’95 This 
discussion is about temporality, but it also, implicitly, about spatiality as well, the proximity or 
otherwise of bodies and bodily contact. Both factors make the moral casuistry of war very different 
for a public power than for a private individual. 
Moreover, the analogy only works for private and public individuals with a just cause of war under 
natural law. That is, private just war and public just war are – to some degree – analogous. But if it is 
two public individuals who are fighting each other, then, whatever the natural justice of the cause, this 
entirely public character of a war moves it into a separate legal order in which different rules apply: 
the ‘voluntary law of nations’, not natural law. A publicly-declared war between two public powers is 
bellum solenne: ‘solemn’, or formal war, which is not the same thing as a just war (though a war 
could be both just and solemn at the same time, but only on the side of the one who had the just 
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cause). Bellum solenne triggers legal effects for both parties – whether their cause is just or unjust – 
that a private war does not, and neither does an ‘improper’ war like a civil war.96 
Book III of DIBP considers the legal effects of bellum solenne. It is here that the spatiality of the 
gentes comes to the fore, both in the operation of these legal effects and in generating the norms of the 
‘voluntary law of nations’ in the first place. We have already seen how, in the context of introducing 
the notion of bellum solenne, Grotius relaxes the strictly juridical definition of the civitas. He 
proceeds to detail its two principal effects, which are, first, a laedendi licentia – a licence to hurt and 
to kill the body of the enemy (there is an interesting similarity of language here with that which 
Grotius uses to characterise the ‘age of giants’: caedium licentia, licence of slaughter.) This is not a 
moral licence, but represents only impunity: a mutual agreement of the nations not to punish the 
perpetrator as a murderer nor otherwise to wage war on him for his deeds, should he come into their 
territory.
97
 Unlike a right arising from a just cause under natural law, this right under the voluntary 
law of nations is not confined to the party with the just cause: it is unlimited and applies equally on 
both sides. As for why the nations would have agreed to this principle, Grotius argues that otherwise 




Under the voluntary law of nations, an enemy equally spatially defined. Enemies are not only ‘those 
who actively bear arms, or who are subject to the one who makes war, but everyone within enemy 
borders’.99 That includes those who travel there knowing of the situation, although foreigners who 
happened to be there at the outbreak of war should be given an opportunity to leave. The reason is that 
anyone within enemy borders could be a cause of harm to the other side. Nevertheless, there remains a 
distinction between such accidentally spatially-located individuals and those who are legally the 
subjects of the enemy sovereign. On these latter, war is personally declared just as it is on their ruler.  
And because of the personal quality of their enmity, they can in principle be attacked ‘everywhere’,100 
and indeed by anyone: under the voluntary law of nations, ‘enemies are deemed to be as nothing’, 
hostes pro nullis habentur.
101
 The right of war ‘is, of itself, not enclosed by territory’.102 Thus ‘on 
their own ground, or on their enemy’s, on ground belonging to no one (in solo nullius), on the sea’, 
they can be killed with impunity. But commonwealths that are in a state of peace with both the 
warring parties can limit the operation of this licence on their territory (in territorio pacato): ‘for civil 
societies could establish that nothing should be done by force to those who were in a certain 
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territory’.103 The case is, in fact, exactly parallel with the rules on the prohibition of hunting that we 
considered in the previous section, in a non-bellicose context. 
Grotius goes on to make this clear in his chapter on acquiring goods in war. The second major legal 
effect of bellum solenne is mutatio dominii, change of dominium. Goods captured by the enemy 
become the property of the enemy in the sense that all nations will defend both the one who captured 
the goods, and anyone whose title to them depends on that capture, in the possession of them.
104
 It is 
similar to occupatio in being a natural and original mode of acquisition (Grotius appeals here to 
Aristotle’s definition of the art of war as naturally acquisitive): natural in the sense that it does not 
require a ‘cause’ but is a right arising from the pure fact of capture.105 The parallel is underlined by 
Grotius’s assertion that ‘the nations agreed that the goods of enemies (res hostium) should be to their 
enemies in no other position than are res nullius’.106 What, however, counts as ‘capture’? Here again a 
spatial dimension is key. A thing is deemed to have been captured where there is no hope of 
recovering it, or it is beyond pursuit: effectively, when it has been brought within the borders or 
within the ‘garrisons’ (praesidia) of the enemy. The requirement of non-recoverability also generates 
a certain temporal condition, of more than temporary capture; but this demand is satisfied by 
fortifications, as in the ager captus we noted above, concerning the definition of territory; or by sheer 
force, for example bringing goods captured at sea back to ‘where the whole fleet is’ (i.e. not simply 
back to naval bases or harbours).
107
 In the case of goods captured from the enemy outside the territory 
of either party waging war, however, the right of capture can be restricted by the ruler of the relevant 




Implicit in bellum solenne, then, as opposed to bellum justum, is that there are not only two parties. In 
a war that is just by natural law, all that needs to be considered, for a legal analysis of the action, is 
that nature and cause of the two contenders. It isolates them juridically. But this is not so for bellum 
solenne, which takes place amidst other states. These states modify the space of war, providing a kind 
of juridical exoskeleton. Crucial to this function in territorialising an otherwise unterritorial right of 
war is the principle, first encountered in the peacetime activity of hunting, that foreigners entering a 
territory have to submit to its laws. Enemies might be pro nullis to each other, their property res 
nullius to each other, but they are not so to third parties, nor are they in the state of nature with respect 
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to those third parties. Rather, they are subject to their law and their courts. Given that bellum solenne 
is the key institution of the voluntary law of nations, Grotius’s entire analysis of this law depends on 
this fundamental principle. 
 
III – AGENCY  
Having mapped out the spatial dimensions of both political communities and war, I want to turn to 
how spatiality intersects with questions of agency and action. To begin with some generalities, 
Grotius, like all his contemporaries within the natural law tradition and within philosophy and 
theology more broadly, has a philosophy of action and agency which privileges the ‘internal act’, the 
act of the soul or mind, over the ‘external act’, the physically embodied spatio-temporal action. The 
‘internal act’ can be an act of reason or of will, but in agency the act of will is more prominent 
because of the motive force of the will which the intellect is not held to possess in the same way. The 
will is responsible for the moral quality of an action and it is also, at least in the voluntarist way of 
thinking to which Grotius rather shakily adheres, responsible for legal and juridical effects such as 
(principally) obligation. Thus, in the analysis of promising, it is the internal act of will that 
‘deliberates’ or obliges the promiser.109 Equally importantly, however, the example of promising 
shows that the act of will is insufficient by itself: as an ‘internal’ act, it cannot be known to another 
unless some ‘sign’ of that will is given, and it cannot be accepted by another unless that other gives 
some sign in return. Thus, the legal effect of promising is not generated by the act of will alone. 
Grotius holds that for an unsignified will to have legal effect is ‘inconsistent with human nature’; 
however, equally it is likewise inconsistent that a signified will have no effect at all.
110
 Grotius offers 
these thoughts in his analysis of the celebrated Roman legal process of ‘prescription’, whereby the 
passage of time leads to the loss of right on the part of one and the acquisition of right on the part of 
the other. Like two other processes, occupatio and custom, prescription generated reams of early 
modern commentary precisely because it did not seem to involve the act of will necessary for legal 
effect. But, as with occupatio and custom, Grotius finds a presumed act of will involved – as he does 
too with mutatio dominii through war: although he says that it arises from pure fact, it is the consent 
of the gentes that allows it to have the status of dominium (or at least, ‘external’ dominium). In sum, 
then, this kind of analysis of action might seem to leach any legal quality out of the physical, spatial 
acts involved. But in fact it is precisely the need – the moral necessity – to accommodate such acts 
within the law that makes an act of will implicit within them, as in the tacit consent which is 
simultaneous with occupation. They also become key to legal interpretation, because, in the absence 
of words – and even in their presence, since words can be ambiguous –, they are what constitutes a 
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sign of the will. This is especially so since the will has to be read off from signs in a manner that can 
carry only probability rather than certainty.
111
 Thus, in an example we looked at above, the legal 
presumption that imperia are arcifinia is an interpretative position governed by the sheer nature of 
territory itself, as physical space to be defended from enemies. 
What, then, about agency in war? Somewhat surprisingly, Grotius (as we have seen) deliberately 
defines war at the outset of the DIBP as a ‘state’, not an ‘action’. Thus, although Cicero had said it 
was ‘contest by force’, it is rather ‘the state of those contending by force’.112 This marks a shift from 
his earlier De iure praedae, in which war was centrally defined as an action, that of ‘armed execution 
upon the armed’.113 If we look at Grotius’s notes to the new definition, however, we see that ‘state’ 
principally refers to a distinct time of war, which includes not only the actual fighting but also 
preparations to fight.
114
 Within this time, Grotius continues to be principally concerned with the 
justifiability of acts of war. As Peter Haggenmacher observes, war as a ‘state’ only recurs very late in 
Book III, in which Grotius discusses truce as a cessation in acts of war but not in the war itself.
115
 
Apart from that, the new definition appears to do no work.  
One effect, however, of defining war as a ‘state’ rather than an action is that De iure praedae’s 
distinctive analysis of the action of war in terms of the four causes of Aristotelian science is lost, 
though it continues to impact on the organisation of the work.
116
 Those four causes are ‘efficient’, 
‘material’, ‘formal’ and ‘final’. In terms of the second, Grotius in De iure praedae distinguishes the 
causa materialis circa quam (‘material cause with regard to which’) by which he means the thing that 
is in contention, effectively the ‘just cause’ of more traditional language, and the causa materialis in 
qua (‘material cause in which’), which is the bodies of the enemy – the bodies that are ‘justly hurt’, 
juste laeduntur, in a just war, which is an action that begins in the will of the belligerent and ends in a 
body. As Haggenmacher notes, all of Book II of DIBP is devoted to the just cause in the first sense, 
while the second, the bodies of the enemy, is almost (although not totally) elided.
117
 I am not sure that 
the elision goes as far as this; Book III, with its laedendi licentia, licence to hurt, is littered with 
bodies: the bodies of ‘hurt’ enemies, but also the bodies of women, working animals, and trees, all of 
which Grotius holds should not be regarded as just objects of belligerent action.
118
 All of these, as 
concrete material objects, are spatially situated, integrated in the inevitably spatial action of war. One 
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thing we might add, though, is that even in De iure praedae, there is no causa materialis ex qua, 
‘material cause out of which’ – there is no body of the belligerent. The belligerent’s body seems to 
disappear into his nature as an ‘efficient cause’, the motive force or mover, of the action. 
What does efficient causality require? Both works – although I return here principally to look at the 
DIBP – insist, true to the model of agency outlined above, on the action of war as voluntary action, an 
act of will.
119
 In voluntary action, the principal agent is the one who acts at his own will: a private 
individual in a private war, the supreme power in a public war. But other agents can be instruments of 
the principal: not instruments in the sense of will-less automata, but those ‘who act at their own will 
such that that will depends upon another’.120 Agents of this kind are, for example, a son in respect of 
his father, or a servant (servus) in respect of the household (familia): appealing to Book V of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Grotius argues that these form ‘part’ of the father and the household 
respectively. Aristotle had in fact declared that the servus – the slave – forms part of the master, but 
that would destroy Grotius’s next point, which is that the position of the subject in the commonwealth 
is analogous to that of the servant in the household, ‘and is thus the instrument of his superior’.121 
Instrumentality, then, is a way of extending voluntary agency through space. This does not mean, 
however, that such instruments are not capable of independent agency and therefore of justice or 
injustice in war. They come up again, with the same reference to Aristotle, at the end of Book II, on 
the question whether those who are bound to obey their superiors need any other cause of war to 
justify their action. The answer is yes: certainly they should disobey their superiors if order to do 
something contrary to God’s command; but even in case of doubt, it is not enough to adopt a default 
position of obeying one’s superior. One should abstain. Christians should not be forced to fight in any 
war, even a just one.
122
 The correct interpretation of the argument about ‘instruments’, then, seems to 
be that a subject makes himself the instrument of his superior in obeying; not that he just is an 
instrument. There remains a choice whether to obey or disobey. 
The instrumental conception of action, therefore, reduces the action back to the act of will, thus again 
seeming to squeeze spatial dimensions almost entirely out of the relevant concept of action. But the 
spatiality that seems inconsiderable if we are talking about one individual as the instrument of another 
does not seem so marginal if what we are talking about is a multitude of individuals – an army 
(exercitus). What is an army? Grotius provides no direct definition, and this is deliberate. It is a matter 
of interpretation, the field of signs to which we referred at the start of this section: signs that are both 
physical in themselves, but are also enmeshed in a broader physical world, the world we live in. Thus, 
in Book II Chapter 16, the chapter on the interpretation of signs, Grotius argues that ‘if in agreements 
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mention is made of an army, let us define an army as that multitude of soldiers, which dares openly to 
invade enemy borders. For historians continually oppose that which happens furtively, or in the 
manner of robbers, to that which takes place by a just army [sc. ‘just’ in the sense of legally just, 
‘formal’]. Which is why one should judge by the strength of the enemy, what number of men makes 
an army’.123 Thus, the physical act of marching brazenly across the borders, a physical act associated 
with a certain number of people (depending on the circumstances), is centrally implicated in the 
conception of the key instrument of formal war, an army. Likewise, a ‘fort’ is a place that can hold off 
the enemy for some time.
124
 
Grotius presses further on the instrumental model when he comes to consider, in Book III, the issue of 
prize or booty. Does anything captured belong as booty to the individual soldier who captured it? In 
Grotius’s estimation, the common opinion is yes. But if so, then in all cases individual soldiers are 
like hunters catching rabbits, private agents rather than instruments of a public agent: the war might 
be public but the component acts are not. Self-consciously against the general perception, Grotius 
distinguishes acts on the part of soldiers undertaken ‘in public service’ (in ministerio publico) from 
those done privately; in the former, what is captured is acquired by the ‘people’, not the soldier. This 
constitutes the distinction between truly public acts of war and private acts which take place with the 
occasion of a public war.
125
 But how do we know which is which? Grotius tackles two different types 
of acquisition in turn. In the case of ground (res soli), this ‘cannot usually be captured except in a 
public act, bringing in an army, with garrisons erected’. Again the model is, implicitly, the Roman 
ager publicus.
126
 Temporary possession by an army is not enough, however: it needs to be fortified 
and defended. Hence the definition of territory from ‘terrifying enemies’ that we examined earlier in 
the paper.
127
 In the case of mobile rather than immobile goods, Grotius again wants to avoid the 
position that in all cases these fall to the individual soldier who takes them. Again, how do we 
distinguish when a soldier is acting as an instrument of a superior, and when he is acting on his own 
initiative? One factor is whether the soldier is acting directly under orders. In such a case, he is clearly 
not the principal agent. But, interestingly, this is not the only factor. Grotius refers to what soldiers 
capture when they are not in procinctu, in battle or other military enterprise, or what they capture 
when they are apart from the army (the Romans specified ten miles away).
128
 It seems, then, that 
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formally speaking the only truly public acts of war, actus bellici, are acts involving an army (the note 
by Grotius’s commentator Gronovius on the phrase actus bellici reads: ‘as in a line of battle, or the 
siege of a city’).129 Grotius’s insistence on the necessarily public character of such an act is in fact 
strong enough for him to change the model of agency. In such an act of war, members of the army are 
no longer said to be ‘instruments’ but ‘representatives’ – and not representatives of the sovereign, but 
representatives of the commonwealth itself: ‘individuals (singuli) bear the person of the 
commonwealth, and act as its vicegerents (eiusque vice funguntur)’.130 
Capture by an army, then, is capture by the political community itself. As far as I can see, this kind of 
act of war is the only act in the entire DIBP in which the commonwealth itself is said to act, implicitly 
as a person, through soldiers which bear its person. The personal model of agency involved might 
seem to take us back to De iure praedae and its strict parallel between private and public occupation 
(‘the occupancy of public possessions is achieved by the same method as occupancy of private 
possessions’). But in fact both the public captor – the army – and what is publicly captured are 
distinguished from the private by their spatial extension. The analysis of capture in war, then, is 
continuous with the earlier story concerning the occupation of land. In both cases, it is, in its very 
capture of space, a centrally political act. The continuity of language is suggestive, too. Grotius there 
stated that occupation per universitatem takes place through the people, or he who commands 
(imperat) the people: a figure whom we might now identify as the imperator, the general of an army. 
Moreover, we also saw him assert that ‘sovereign power has two subject matters, primarily persons, 
which is sometimes enough on its own, as in a company’ – or, we might now say, an army? 
(exercitus) – ‘of men, women and children seeking a new home, and secondarily place, which is 
called territory.’131 I want to suggest, then, that exercitus is Grotius’s fifth term, after gens, populus, 
civitas, and respublica, for limning the contours of the political community. A body politic on the 
move, detached from place, is an army; conversely, the army is, through representation, the body 
politic in another place. 
 
CONCLUSION 
‘Huge is this your kingdom’, proclaims DIBP’s dedicatory letter to Louis XIII, ‘which runs through 
so great spaces (spatia) of such happy lands to both seas: but it is kingdom greater than this kingdom, 
that you do not covet other kingdoms,’ nor ‘disturb the old boundaries’.132 Right at the start, Grotius’s 
invocation of the geographical space and situation of France sets the agenda for a work that I have 
sought to analyse as a law of war and peace for a situated world. His conception of political 
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community includes spatial extension at its core, a relationship between politics and place that began 
in ‘the first times’, prima illa tempora, with the dispersal of the gentes and the concomitant division 
of lands following the destruction of the tower of Babel. The model of agency that he deploys remains 
one of personality, in which spatial extension has to be theorised on a model of instrumentality or, 
uniquely in the case of the army, representation. But it is remarkable that the commonwealth itself 
appears only to acquire this personality in that one instance of a spatially extended act, the occupation 
of land. Grotius otherwise resists theorising the international arena in terms of states as persons, a 
lens, as suggested at the outset, which precisely makes it hard to see those spaces of sovereignty that 
both we and Grotius call imperia, empires.  
Spatiality and agency intersect partly because voluntary actions acquire their signification in space, 
partly because voluntary actors move through space. Spatial division allows for movement both 
private and public, of individuals and of peoples. Private movement – trade, travel, the acquisition of 
natural resources – is largely favoured by Grotius, contained as it is within the geo-political order: 
unconstrained in spaces not occupied by the gentes, subjected to civil law in spaces that are. Grotius is 
more ambivalent in respect of public movement, however. Under natural law, it is licit for peoples to 
occupy any lands that have remained unoccupied after the original division; it seems clear, indeed, 
from his description of agri arcifinii, that the current pattern of settlement is the result of a history of 
occupation as well as division. But, while there is apparently still room for further public movement 
of this kind, he does not positively advocate settlement in the present; his example of a people seeking 
novae sedes is one of forced exile. Notoriously, his theory does allow for a natural just war on the part 
of public agents against groups which systematically violate the law of nature.
133
 And yet, as we have 
also seen, gentes can remain gentes – and thus under the rules of bellum solenne, not natural justice – 
even with quite a high degree of technically unjust behaviour. Again under the voluntary law of 
nations, Grotius allows land capture by armies, and the acquisition of imperium.
134
 But he does not 
approve the practice unless absolutely necessary for security; even then, he advocates leaving the 
conquered with as much imperium as possible. Grotius’s anti-Bodinian argument for the divisibility of 
sovereignty (imperium) allows precisely for this.
135
 As his dedicatory letter to Louis XIII suggests, the 
morality of international politics seems to be one of leaving things in place. 
To sum up, and to return to the Introduction, Grotius’s global political world in DIBP is not primarily 
one of sovereign states as international actors, but of land spaces over which sovereign power 
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sovereign, pp. 85-86, argues that while Grotius’s conception of sovereignty is essentially scholastic (with which 
I agree), he is closer to the modern concept of sovereignty in the international domain. I think, however, that 
Grotius’s scholastic, teleological conception of sovereign power crosses both the internal and the external 
dimensions of politics, and is precisely of a piece with his ‘moral’ reasoning about political space.  
(imperium) is exercised. It is governed by a law (ius) of war and peace that does indeed rest upon a 
core of natural rights (iura), but which is nevertheless conditioned in its application by a supple form 
of ‘moral’ reasoning which spatially limits the operation of natural law. Along with its flexibility in 
the location of sovereign power, this vision lost out to the seductive appeal of states as moral persons 
which would go on to form the basis of the early modern ‘law of nations’. I have tried to suggest that 
a sophisticated international political thought was lost in that process. 
 
